3  73 


v\r. 

Christianity  and  World  Problems:  No.  3 


FRANCE 

AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


BY 


KIRBY  PAGE 


Author  of  “ war:  its  causes,  consequences  and  cure” 
Editor  of  “Christianity  and  economic  problems” 


NEW 


YORK 


GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


Ten  Cents  Net 


COPYRIGHT,  1923, 

BY  GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

I:  WHY  FRANCE  IS  AFRAID .  5 

II :  FRENCH  METHODS  OF  SEEKING  SECURITY .  7 

(1)  Military  Force 

(a)  Disarmament  of  Germany 

(b)  Military  Occupation 

(c)  Powerful  French  Army 

(2)  Territorial  Transfers 

(3)  Diplomatic  Measures 

(4)  Economic  Provisions 

(5)  A  Heavy  Indemnity 

(6)  Summary 

III:  CONSEQUENCES  OF  FRENCH  FEAR .  22 

(1)  Effects  Upon  Militarism 

(2)  Effects  Upon  the  League  of  Nations 

(3)  Effects  Upon  the  German  People 

(4)  Economic  Effects  Upon  Europe 

(5)  Effects  Upon  French  Security 

IV:  what;can  the  united  states  do  about 

IT? 


30 


I  ; 


■ 

■ 


J  . 


/ 


•  •  ,  , 


I:  WHY  FRANCE  IS  AFRAID 


France  is  desperately  afraid.  Several  visits  to  Europe 
during  and,  since  the  war  have  helped  the  writer  to  under¬ 
stand  the  ground  of  her  fear.  A  recent  stay  of  three 
months  in  Paris,  Berlin  and  London  has  intensified  his 
keen  appreciation  of  the  position  of  France. 

Miles  and  miles  of  white  crosses  in  military  cemeteries 
symbolize  the  first  reason  for  the  fear  of  France.  A  mil¬ 
lion  and  a  half  Frenchmen  died  in  defence  of  their  coun¬ 
try.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  others  are  crippled  for 
life.  From  six  thousand  to  eight  thousand  square  miles 
of  French  soil  were  laid  waste;  hundreds  of  cities  and 
towns  were  devastated;  half  a  million  houses  were  de¬ 
molished;  railways,  industrial  plants  and  mines  were 
wrecked ;  280  billion  francs  were  expended  in  carrying  on 
the  war. 

France  is  afraid  that  this  price  may  have  to  be  paid 
again  in  a  decade  or  in  a  generation.  She  is  deeply  con¬ 
scious  of  the  fact  that  her  soil  has  been  invaded  many 
times  during  the  past  two  centuries.  Impressions  of  the 
forty-four  important  wars  in  Europe  during  the  last  hun¬ 
dred  years  are  still  vivid  in  her  memory.  She  assumes 
that  further  wars  will  be  fought  in  the  coming  decades. 
She  is  afraid  that  Germany  with  her  sixty  millions  will 
recover  and  again  become  a  menace  to  Europe.  This  fear 
is  increased  by  the  collapse  of  the  Franco-Russian  alli¬ 
ance,  which  has  deprived  her  of  the  support  of  a  powerful 
ally. 

Mingled  with  fear  is  hatred  of  Germany.  Fear  and 
hatred  are  always  found  together.  Because  of  fear,  many 
of  the  French  people  have  learned  to  hate.  Four  years 
of  hostilities  and  war-propaganda  raised  this  hatred  to 
new  heights.  There  has  never  been  any  doubt  in  France 
that  Germany  deliberately  and  diabolically  planned  the 
war.  German  atrocities  during  the  war  not  only  shocked 

5 


6 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


the  whole  world,  they  provoked  intense  hatred  in  France. 
Throughout  the  war  all  belligerent  Governments  deliber¬ 
ately  cultivated  hatred  of  the  enemy.  France  has  no 
confidence  whatever  in  German  promises  and  does  not 
believe  that  Germany  has  any  intentions  of  fulfilling  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  if  she  can  possibly  find  a  way  of 
escape. 

The  writer  requests  his  readers  to  keep  constantly  in 
mind  that  the  present  discussion  does  not  deal  with  the 
mistakes  and  crimes  of  the  German  leaders  before  or  since 
the  war.  An  account  of  Germany’s  heavy  share  of  re¬ 
sponsibility  for  starting  the  war,  German  atrocities  during 
the  war,  and  the  fatal  blunders  of  German  leaders  since 
the  war,  is  too  long  a  story  to  record  here.  Many  vol¬ 
umes  have  been  written  on  these  points  and  the  essential 
facts  are  well  known  to  the  American  people.  This  par¬ 
ticular  discussion  is  confined  to  an  analysis  of  the  French 
policy. 


II-  FRENCH  METHODS  OF  SEEK¬ 
ING  SECURITY 

In  view  of  her  stupendous  losses,  deep  fear  and  keen 
suspicion,  it  was  natural  that  France  should  emerge  from 
the  war  with  a  passion  for  security.  The  French  leaders 
were  convinced  that  the  only  way  of  achieving  permanent 
security  was  by  crushing  Germany  completely ,  so  com¬ 
pletely  as  to  remove  all  possibility  of  the  recovery  of  her 
military  and  economic  power  within  a  generation  or  more. 

During  the  early  days  of  the  Peace  Conference  it  be¬ 
came  evident  that  the  French  leaders  had  planned  in 
considerable  detail  how  this  should  be  accomplished. 
The  available  evidence  seems  to  indicate  conclusively 
that  France  sought  to  deal  with  Germany  in  five  ways: 
(1)  Military  Force;  (2)  Territorial  Transfers;  (3)  Dip¬ 
lomatic  Measures;  (4)  Economic  Provisions;  (5)  A 
Heavy  Indemnity. 


(1 )  Military  Force 

(a)  Disarmament  of  Germany.  This  was  the  first 
plank  in  the  French  platform.  In  this  desire  she  was 
joined  by  the  whole  world.  It  was  natural,  therefore, 
that  the  Armistice  terms  and  the  Peace  Treaty  should 
contain  detailed  specifications  on  this  point.  Germany  s 
army  was  reduced  to  a  mere  police  force  of  100,000  men. 
Compulsory  military  service  was  abolished.  The  maxi¬ 
mum  amount  of  armaments  which  Germany  could  pos¬ 
sess  was  carefully  specified.  All  fortified  works,  fort¬ 
resses  and  field  works  within  fifty  kilometres  of  the  east 
bank  of  the  Rhine  were  disarmed  and  dismantled.  Pro¬ 
visions  were  being  made  for  the  distribution  of  the  Gcr- 
man  navy  among  the  Allies  or  for  its  destruction,  when 
the  Germans  took  the  matter  into  their  own  hands  and 
sent  practically  all  their  major  ships  to  the  bottom  o 

7 


8  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

Scapa  Flow.  Thus  Germany  was  left  without  a  navy 
of  any  consequence.  Nothing  was  overlooked  in  the  ef¬ 
fort  to  destroy  completely  her  military  and  naval  power. 

How  completely  this  was  accomplished  is  revealed  by 
a  comparison  of  the  German  army  of  100,000  with  the 
armies  of  some  of  the  smaller  countries  of  Europe  since 
the  war:1  Belgium,  118,000;  Czecho-Slovakia,  149,- 
000;  Jugo-Slavia,  152,000;  Spain,  165,000;  Roumania, 
180,000;  Poland,  293,000. 

(6)  Military  Occupation  of  Strategic  German  Centers . 
Not  only  must  Germany  be  disarmed,  but  the  French 
leaders  believed  also  that  security  demanded  the  military 
occupation  of  parts  of  Germany.  Article  428  of  the 
Treaty  provides  for  the  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  together  with  the  bridgeheads,  by  Allied  troops 
for  a  period  of  fifteen  years. 

The  burden  of  this  occupation  has  been  assumed  by 
the  French.  At  the  end  of  June,  1922,  the  French  Army 
of  Occupation  numbered  150,000,  including  many  thou¬ 
sands  of  dark-skinned  African  troops.  Ex-Premier  Nitti 
tells  us  that  in  March,  1920,  there  were  55,000  colored 
troops  on  the  Rhine.2  The  French  claim  a  distinction 
between  black  and  colored  troops,  hence  their  insistence 
that  there  are  no  black  troops  on  the  Rhine. 

During  the  Peace  Conference,  French  leaders  en¬ 
deavored  strenuously  to  secure  the  permanent  military 
occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  They  also 
sought  the  military  occupation  of  Essen  and  other  parts 
of  the  Ruhr.  As  early  as  February  7,  1919,  a  committee 
of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  headed  by  M.  Loucheur,  a 
member  of  M.  Clemenceau’s  Cabinet,  recommended  the 
military  occupation  of  Essen  and  the  principal  Krupp 
establishments  and  the  greater  part  of  the  Rheinish- 
Westphalian  coal  fields.3  On  June  24,  1919,  in  a  meet¬ 
ing  of  the  Council  of  Four,  M.  Clemenceau  again  advo¬ 
cated  the  seizing  of  Essen.4 

1  See  Francesco  Nitti,  “The  Decadence  of  Europe,”  p.  297  ff. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  135. 

aRay  Stannard  Baker,  “Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,” 
Vol.  I,  p.  363. 

*  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  96. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  9 

(c)  Maintenance  oj  a  Powerful  French  Army.  In  ad¬ 
dition  to  the  disarmament  of  Germany  and  the  military 
occupation  of  German  centers,  the  French  program  called 
for  a  powerful  French  army.  President  Wilson  advo¬ 
cated  the  abolition  of  compulsory  military  service,  not 
only  in  Germany  but  universally.  To  this  the  French 
leaders  offered  the  most  vigorous  objection.  They  were 
eager  to  have  it  abolished  completely  in  Germany,  but 
would  not  consider  for  a  moment  its  abolition  in  France. 

In  carrying  out  her  policy,  France  has  developed  a  very 
powerful  army.  In  July,  1921,  nearly  three  years  after 
the  war,  she  had  an  army  of  810,000  men.1  This  is  a 
larger  and  more  effective  army  than  Germany  had  before 
the  war.  At  the  end  of  June,  1922,  the  French  army  num¬ 
bered  728,000  men.  Included  in  this  number  were  ap¬ 
proximately  200,000  African  troops.  By  the  end  of  1923, 
France  expects  to  have  4,000  military  and  naval 
aeroplanes,  with  twenty-one  units  of  airmen.2  She 
has  also  greatly  strengthened  her  navy  and  is  steadily  in¬ 
creasing  the  number  of  her  submarines. 

(2)  Territorial  Transfers 

The  second  plank  in  the  French  platform  was  the 
weakening  of  Germany  by  territorial  transfers.  The  first 
of  these  items  was  Alsace-Lorraine.  At  this  point  she 
received  the  support  of  practically  the  whole  world.  In 
addition,  Germany  was  deprived  by  the  Treaty  of  the 
following  territory :  All  her  colonies,  parts  of  Silesia  and 
Upper  Silesia,  the  Danzig  Corridor,  Memel,  Eupen,  Mal- 
medy,  and  part  of  Schleswig.  The  Saar  Basin  and  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  were  lost  for  at  least  fifteen  years. 

In  addition  to  the  actual  provisions  of  the  Treaty, 
French  leaders  earnestly  contended  for  still  further  trans¬ 
fers  of  territory.  They  maintained  that  French  security 
demanded  the  absolute  and  permanent  separation  from 
Germany  of  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine — embrac¬ 
ing  ten  thousand  square  miles  and  more  than  five  million 
inhabitants.  They  also  sought  the  permanent  annexa¬ 
tion  of  the  whole  Saar  Basin. 

1  Francesco  Nitti,  “The  Wreck  of  Europe,”  p.  137. 

2  “The  Decadence  of  Europe,”  p.  195. 


10  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

The  earliest  written  record  of  the  demand  of  France 
for  the  separation  of  the  Rhineland  and  the  annexation 
of  the  Saar  is  found  in  a  secret  treaty  negotiated  between 
France  and  Russia,  in  February,  1917.  In  a  letter  from 
the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Petrograd,  dated  February  14,  1917,  the 
Russian  Government  agreed  to  support  France  at  the 
Peace  Conference  in  the  following  demands:1  “Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  to  be  restored  to  France.  The  frontiers  are 
to  be  extended  at  least  up  to  the  limits  of  the  former 
Principality  of  Lorraine,  and  are  to  be  drawn  up  at  the 
discretion  of  the  French  Government  so  as  to  provide 
for  the  strategical  needs  and  for  the  inclusion  in  French 
territory  of  the  entire  iron  district  of  Lorraine  and  of 
the  entire  coal  district  of  the  Saar  Valley.  The  rest  of 
the  territories  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
which  now  form  part  of  the  German  Empire,  are  to  be 
entirely  separated  from  Germany  and  freed  from  all 
political  and  economic  dependence  upon  her.  The  ter¬ 
ritories  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  outside  French 
territory  are  to  be  constituted  as  autonomous  and  neutral 
States,  and  are  to  be  occupied  by  French  troops  until 
such  times  as  the  enemy  states  have  completely  satisfied 
all  the  conditions  and  guarantees  indicated  in  the  treaty 
of  peace.” 

The  evidence  contained  in  the  records  of  the  Peace 
Conference  is  overwhelming  and  leaves  absolutely  no 
doubt  whatever  that  the  demands  of  this  secret  treaty 
formed  an  essential  part  of  the  French  program  at  Ver¬ 
sailles.  On  March  14,  1919,  Marshal  Foch  sent  a  long 
memorandum  to  President  Wilson  which  demanded  a 
military  frontier  of  the  Rhine.2  He  pleaded  that  Ger¬ 
many  be  deprived  “of  all  territorial  sovereignty  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river.”  This  demand  was  ably  sup¬ 
ported  by  M.  Clemenceau.  M.  Tardieu,  chief  associate 
of  M.  Clemenceau  at  the  Peace  Conference,  presented 
a  long  memorandum  in  which  he  set  forth  the  French 

1  “Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,”  Vol.  I,  pp.  57,  58.  (Italics 
mine.) 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  234. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  11 

demand  for  complete  and  permanent  ownership  of  the 
coal  mines  and  outright  annexation  of  the  Saar  Basin.1 2 

There  is  further  evidence  that  French  leaders  sought 
to  separate  the  Rhineland  from  Germany.  After  being 
compelled  to  abandon  their  extreme  demands  at  Ver¬ 
sailles,  they  sought  to  accomplish  by  intrigue  that  which 
they  had  failed  to  gain  by  diplomacy.  In  a  letter  to 
President  Wilson,  dated  May  22,  1919,  General  Pershing 
said:  “This  morning,  General  Mangin,  Commanding 
General  of  the  French  Army  at  Mayence,  sent  a  Colonel 
of  his  Staff  to  General  Liggett’s  headquarters  at  Coblentz 
to  inquire  what  our  attitude  would  be  toward  a  political 
revolution  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine  for  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  an  Independent  Rhineland  Republic,  free 
from  Germany.  He  inquired  what  the  American  atti¬ 
tude  would  be  toward  such  a  new  Republic.  The  Staff 
Officer  stated  that  they  had  fifty  deputies  ready  to  send 
into  the  American  sector  to  assist  in  starting  the  revo- 
tut'ion.,,2 

Ex-Premier  Nitti  has  called  our  attention  to  the  report 
of  a  French  military  commission  concerning  conditions 
in  the  occupied  areas,  dated  May  25,  1922.  This  report 
points  out  the  difficulties  involved  in  separating  the 
Rhineland  in  so  short  a  time  as  fifteen  years,  and  makes 
certain  suggestions  as  to  how  the  process  may  be 
hastened.  It  goes  on  to  say:  “These  are  doubtless  am¬ 
bitious  plans,  but  they  will  be  amply  justified  if  carried 
out  with  wisdom  and  judgment,  in  measure  os  Germany 
forfeits  her  pledges.”3 

There  is  an  abundance  of  evidence  that  the  French 
leaders  have  never  ceased  to  encourage  separatist  move¬ 
ments.  For  more  than  four  years  they  have  given  sup¬ 
port  to  the  Rheinische  Republick,  a  propaganda  news¬ 
paper  of  the  separatists.  During  a  recent  trip  to  France 
and  the  occupied  areas,  the  writer  had  the  fact  of  French 
support  of  separatist  movements  called  to  his  attention 
so  frequently  that  there  seems  to  him  to  be  no  doubt 

'  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  72.  . 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  II.  p.  87.  (Italics  mine.) 

3  “The  Decadence  of  Europe,”  p.  xvn.  (Italics  mine.) 


12 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


whatever  at  this  point.  Several  French  officials  were 
frank  enough  to  admit  their  desire  to  see  such  a  move¬ 
ment  succeed. 

(3)  Diplomatic  Measures 

The  third  plank  in  the  French  platform  was  the 
strengthening  of  countries  that  were  enemies  of  Ger¬ 
many,  actually  or  potentially.  Throughout  the  Peace 
Conference,  France  was  a  strong  advocate  of  buffer 
states.  President  Wilson  himself  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  “the  only  real  interest  of  France  in  Poland  is  in 
weakening  Germany  by  giving  Poland  territory  to  which 
she  has  no  right.”1 

In  a  memorandum  dated  March  31,  1919,  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  said:  “If  one  is  obliged,  in  giving  to  these  young 
peoples  frontiers  without  which  they  cannot  live,  to 
transfer  to  their  sovereignty  the  sons  of  the  very  Ger¬ 
mans  who  have  enslaved  them,  it  is  to  be  regretted  and 
it  must  be  done  with  moderation,  but  it  cannot  be 
avoided.”2 

After  carefully  examining  the  secret  minutes  and  other 
records  of  the  Peace  Conference,  Mr.  Ray  Stannard 
Baker  has  written:  “The  central  purpose  of  the  policy 
of  France — here,  as  always,  dictated  by  French  fears — 
was  to  build  up  a  ring  of  small  States  around  Germany 
and  make  these  dependent  upon  her,  rather  than  upon 
Germany,  for  protection.  Poland,  with  the  Polish  Army 
commanded  by  French  generals,  thus  became  a  military 
satellite  of  France;  and  this  was  almost  equally  true  of 
Roumania  and  of  others  of  the  small  States.  The  French 
supported  throughout  the  Peace  Conference — the  rec¬ 
ord  is  full  of  it — the  demands  of  these  smaller  States 
for  the  utmost  aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of  the 
enemy  States.”3  Everywhere  in  Europe,  France  is  seek¬ 
ing  to  strengthen  her  position  against  Germany  by  a 
series  of  understandings  and  alliances. 

r—  ■  - — 

1  “Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,”  Vol.  II,  p.  60. 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  251. 

3  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  396. 


13 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

(Jf.)  Economic  Provisions 

The  fourth  plank  in  the  French  platform. was  the 
crippling  of  Germany’s  economic  power.  When  we  pause 
for  a  moment  to  consider  the  terrible  financial  plight  m 
which  France  found  herself  at  the  end  of  the  war,  we  find 
it  easy  to  sympathize  with  her  fear  of  Germany  s  eco¬ 
nomic  power.  Thousands  of  square  miles  of  her  soil  a 
been  devastated,  hundreds  of  villages  and  cities  de¬ 
molished,  industrial  plants  and  mines  wrecked,  one 
had  expended  enormous  sums  in  waging  the  war.  one 
had  raised  only  a  small  proportion  of  her  annual  bud¬ 
get  by  taxation,  and  had  piled  up  a  stupendous  debt. 
The  Government  was  faced  with  the  imminent  prospect 
of  bankruptcy.  On  the  other  hand,  German,  soil  ha 
scarcely  been  touched  and  the  German  industrial  plants 
were  intact. 

Under  such  circumstances,  it  was  inevitable  that  France 
should  seek  to  cripple  Germany’s  economic  power.  Such 
a  policy  had  been  foreshadowed  by  the  recommendations 
of  the  Paris  Economic  Conference  of  June,  1916.  At  that 
conference  elaborate  plans  were  made  for  “the  war  after 
the  war.”  The  Allied  nations  agreed  upon  a  drastic 
commercial  discrimination  in  each  other’s  favor  and  all 
aimed  at  Germany.  Professor  A.  A.  Young,  economic 
adviser  to  the  American  Peace  Commission,  has  pointed 
out  that  these  agreements  “were  revived  in  the  French 
proposals  at  the  Peace  Conference.  They  were  probably 
a  fairly  accurate  expression  of  French  policy.  .  . 

With  this  as  a  background,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  economic  sections  of  the  Treaty  are  drastic  m  the 
extreme.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  well  to  recall  that  the 
numerous  transfers  of  German  territory,  including  all 
her  colonies,  made  a  heavy  drain  upon  her  economic  re¬ 
sources,  especially  in  coal  and  iron.  German  losses  m 
this  regard  were  as  follows:  Area,  13  per  cent,  popula¬ 
tion,  10  per  cent;  coal  production,  25  per  cent  (before 
the  invasion  of  the  Ruhr,  which  contains  72  per  cent  ot 
the  remainder) ;  iron  ore  production,  75  per  cent;  zmc  ore 

1UA  Histoiy  of  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris,”  edited  by  H.  W.  V. 
Temperley,  Vol.  5,  p.  65. 


14  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

production,  68  per  cent;  wheat  and  rye  production,  15 
per  cent;  potato  production,  18  per  cent. 

In  addition  to  the  economic  loss  inherent  in  the  trans¬ 
fers  of  territory,  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  Germany 
was  compelled  to  give  up  90  per  cent  of  her  merchant 
shipping.  Control  of  her  river  system  was  taken  out  of 
her  hands  and  placed  under  the  control  of  international 
commissions.  Out  of  her  reduced  supply  of  coal,  she  is 
required  to  deliver  to  France,  Belgium  and  Italy  a  maxi¬ 
mum  of  42  million  tons  each  year  for  five  years,  and  a 
decreasing  amount  for  five  years  thereafter.  She  was 
also  required  to  hand  over  to  the  Allies  5,000  locomotives 
and  150,000  railway  wagons. 

Germany  is  also  obliged  to  deliver  to  France  35,000 
tons  of  benzol,  50,000  tons  of  coal  tar,  and  30,000  tons 
of  sulphate  of  ammonia,  each  year  for  three  years.  She 
is  also  compelled  to  furnish  France  and  Belgium  the  fol¬ 
lowing  quantity  of  live  stock:  140,000  milk  cows,  40,000 
heifers,  120,000  sheep,  40,000  fillies  and  mares,  700  stal¬ 
lions,  4,000  bulls,  1,200  rams,  15,000  sows. 

The  Reparation  Commission  has  been  given  power  to 
demand  the  surrender  of  any  great  business  property  in 
Germany.  As  President  Wilson  pointed  out  in  his  St. 
Louis  address:  “The  Reparation  Commission  can  deter¬ 
mine  the  currents  of  trade,  the  conditions  of  credit,  of  in¬ 
ternational  credit;  it  can  determine  how  much  Germany 
is  going  to  buy,  where  it  is  going  to  buy,  and  how  it  is 
going  to  pay  for  it.” 

An  elaborate  series  of  provisions  forces  Germany  to 
concede  “most  favored  nation”  treatment  to  the  Allies, 
while  she  receives  no  such  reciprocal  favor  in  return. 
The  Allies  also  assumed  the  right  to  seize  all  property 
owned  by  German  citizens  in  ceded  territories  and  in 
Allied  countries.  Concerning  this  provision,  President 
Wilson  admitted  that  the  Allies  “had  taken  certain 
liberties  with  international  law.” 

Germany  is  also  required  to  pay  all  costs  of  the  Armies 
of  Occupation.  This  item  in  itself  constitutes  a  heavy 
drain  upon  German  finance.  According  to  the  official 
figures  of  the  Reparation  Commission,  the  total  cost  of 
the  Armies  of  Occupation  from  the  Armistice  to  the  end 


15 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


of  December,  1922,  was  3,992,490,942  gold  marks,  or  ap¬ 
proximately  one  billion  dollars.1  This  amount  by  no 
means  covers  the  entire  cost  to  Germany,  but  only  the 
amounts  to  be  refunded  to  the  Allies.  Nor  does  it  cover 

expenses  during  1923.  . 

It  is  worth  pointing  out,  moreover,  that  as  against 
this  cost  of  3,992,490,942  gold  marks,  the  total  amount 
spent  by  Germany  on  her  army  and  navy  during  the  four 
years  from  1910  to  1913,  when  the  mad  race  of ^arma¬ 
ments  was  at  its  height,  amounted  to  only  5,677,000,000 
gold  marks.2 *  That  is  to  say,  the  average  annual  cost  of 
the  Armies  of  Occupation  has  been  more  than  two-thirds 
as  much  as  the  average  annual  cost  of  the  entire  German 
army  and  navy  during  the  four  years  preceding  the ! 

World  War. 

There  is  further  evidence  that  the  French  leaders  have 
sought  vigorously  to  weaken  Germany  economically.  At 
the  end  of  the  war  the  German  gold  reserve  amounted 
to  about  800  million  dollars.  The  American  and  British 
delegates  pointed  out  the  disastrous  consequences  to  Ger¬ 
man  finance  if  the  gold  reserve  should  be  decreased. 
Nevertheless,  on  February  17,  1919,  in  the  Council  of 
Ten,  we  find  the  French  representative,  M.  Loucqeur, 
suggesting  that  the  whole  of  this  amount  be  demanded. 
It  was  the  same  M.  Loucheur,  a  member  of  the  French 
Cabinet,  who  suggested,  in  London  in  1921  that  the 
Allies  demand  25  per  cent  of  the  capital  of  all  German 

corporations.4  .  ,  .  , 

French  fear  was  the  chief  factor  in  prolonging  the 
blockade  of  Germany  for  six  months  after  the  Armistice, 
with  the  consequent  appalling  hunger  and  starvation  and 
the  general  dislocation  of  German  industry.  In  a  letter 
to  President  Wilson,  on  February  4,  1919,  Mr.  Herbert 
Hoover  said:  “The  French,  by  obstruction  of  every 
financial  measure  that  we  can  propose  to  the  feeding  of 
Germany,  in  the  attempt  to  compel  us  to  loan  money 


1  Reparation  Commission,  “Costs  of  the  Armies  of  Occupation,”  Dec. 

31  1922  jj 

2 gee  Kirby  Page,  “War:  Its  Causes,  Consequences  and  Cure,”  p.  12 

^P"a Woodrow1  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,”  Vol.  II,  p.  396. 

The  Decadence  of  Europe,”  p.  xiv. 


3  cr 

4  Uf 


16  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

to  Germany  for  this  purpose,  have  defeated  every  step 
so  far  for  getting  them  the  food  which  we  have  been 
promising  for  three  months/51 

The  French  attitude  toward  supplying  Germany  with 
raw  materials  is  indicated  by  the  remark  of  M.  Klotz, 
French  Minister  of  Finance,  in  the  Council  of  Ten,  on 
February  10th:  “The  Allies  had  never  agreed  to  supply 
raw  materials  to  Germany.  The  devastated  countries 
would  never  agree  to  raw  materials  being  supplied  to 
Germany,  where  the  factories  were  still  intact,  until  their 
own  industries  had  been  re-established.552 

The  French  leaders  were  also  insistent  in  their  demand 
that  Germany  should  be  excluded  from  foreign  markets 
— in  addition  to  being  deprived  of  all  colonies  and  90  per 
cent  of  her  merchant  shipping.  On  March  31,  1919,  M. 
Clemenceau  wrote:  “The  exclusion  of  Germany  from 
foreign  markets  would  be  total  and  would  last  for  some 
time.553 

Professor  A.  A.  Young,  economic  adviser  to  the  Amer¬ 
ican  Peace  Commission,  has  commented  on  the  French 
economic  policy  as  follows:  “Their  more  important  pro¬ 
posals,  taken  as  a  whole,  seemed  to  embody  the  extreme 
and^  suicidal  policy  I  have  just  described.  Especially 
when  they  were  coupled  with  the  other  French  proposals, 
it  was  easy  to  read  into  them  a  purpose  to  destroy  the 
foundations  of  the  economic  life  of  the  Central  Powers, 
and  of  Germany  in  particular.  Militarism  and  economic 
policy  seemed  to  have  joined  hands.554 

(5)  A  Heavy  Indemnity 

The  fifth  plank  in  the  French  platform  was  the  im¬ 
posing  of  a  heavy  indemnity.  One  of  the  great  struggles 
of  the  Peace  Conference  centered  about  this  point.  The 
whole  world  agreed  that  Germany  should  be  obliged  to 
restore  the  devastated  areas  of  France  and  Belgium,  in 
so  far  as  this  was  possible.  Upon  this  question  the 
delegates  at  the  Peace  Conference  were  in  entire  accord. 

1  “Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,”  Vol.  Ill,  p.  328. 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  17. 

8  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  251. 

4  “What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,”  edited  by  E.  M.  House,  p.  299. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


17 


Rathenau  and  other  German  leaders  freely  admitted  the 
justice  of  this  demand.  The  struggle  came  over  the 
question  as  to  whether  Germany  should  be  made  to  pay 
the  entire  cost  of  the  war,  or  a  huge  indemnity  in  excess 
of  the  cost  of  restoring  the  devastated  areas. 

The  actual  decision  of  the  Peace  Conference  in  this 
regard  is  well  known.  The  principle  was  adopted  of 
including  pensions  and  other  war  costs,  in  addition  •  to 
actual  restoration.  The  total  amount  of  reparation,  or 
indemnity,  was  not  agreed  upon,  but  was  referred  to  the 
Reparation  Commission,  with  instructions  to  notify  the 
German  Government  of  their  assessment  on  or  before 
May  1,  1921.  This  Commission  assessed  the  claims  of 
the  Allies  against  Germany  at  138  billion  gold  marks,  of 
which  6  billions  were  for  the  Belgian  debt.  Of  this  total 
amount,  according  to  the  estimate  of  Mr.  J.  M.  Keynes, 
representative  of  the  British  Treasury  at  the  Peace  Con¬ 
ference,  about  one-third  is  to  cover  the  cost  of  restoring 
the  devastated  areas,  and  two-thirds  to  cover  pensions 
and  other  war  costs.1 

As  enormous  as  is  this  total  sum,  it  does  not  begin 
to  approach  the  maximum  demands  made  by  the  French 
and  British  leaders  at  Versailles.  During  his  General 
Election  campaign  of  1918,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  talked 
in  terms  of  a  war  indemnity  of  120  billion  dollars.  At 
the  Peace  Conference,  M.  Loucheur,  a  French  Cabinet 
member,  accepted  these  figures  and  suggested  that  it  be 
raised  to  200  billion  dollars — 800  billion  gold  marks,  in¬ 
stead  of  a  mere  138  billions.2 3  In  this  connection,  it 
should  be  remembered  that,  according  to  the  estimate 
of  Sir  George  Paish,  the  total  pre-war  wealth  of  Ger- 

1  Concerning  the  inclusion  of  pensions  in  the  total  amount  due  for 
reparations,  Mr.  Thomas  William  Lamont,  Economic  Adviser  to  the 
American  Peace  Commission,  says:  “I  well  remember  the  day  upon 
which  President  Wilson  determined  to  support  the  inclusion  of  pensions 
in  the  reparation  bill.  Some  of  us  were  gathered  in  his  library  in  the 
Place  des  Etats  Unis,  having  been  summoned  by  him  to  discuss  this 
particular  question  of  pensions.  We  explained  to  him  that  we  couldn’t 
find  a  single  lawyer  in  the  American  delegation  that  would  give  an 

opinion  in  favor  of  including  pensions.  All  the  logic  was  against  it. 
‘Logic!  Logic!’  exclaimed  the  President,  ‘I  don’t  give  a  damn  for  logic. 
I  am  going  to  include  pensions!’” — “What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,” 
p.  272,  italics  mine. 

3  “Woodrow  Wilson  and  World  Settlement,”  Vol.  II,  p.  372. 


18 


/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

many  was  only  80  billion  dollars,  or  320  billion  gold 
marks,  while  her  post-war  wealth  has  probably  been  re 
duced  to  half  this  amount. 

(6)  Summary 

We  have  seen  that  on  three  main  points — separation 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  from  Germany,  permanent 
annexation  to  France  of  the  Saar  Basin,  and  an  indem¬ 
nity  covering  war  costs — the  French  leaders  were  com¬ 
pelled  to  abandon  their  extreme  demands.  Concerning 
the  struggle  over  these  points,  M.  Tardieu  has  written. 
“Calm  and  unruffled  on  most  points,  bitter  and  stormy 
on  three  of  the  most  important  to  France;  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  the  Saar  Valley,  and  the  question  of  rep¬ 
arations.  These  three  points  took  up  long  sittings  and 

led  to  fierce  debates.”  .  ,  .  _  .  , 

Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  Chief  Territorial  Adviser  to  the 

American  Peace  Commission,  tells  of  being  summoned, 
with  two  of  his  associates,  by  President  Wilson  during 
the  crisis  of  the  Peace  Conference,  at  which  time  the 
President  said:  “Gentlemen,  I  am  in  trouble  and  I  have 
sent  for  you  to  help  me  out.  The  matter  is  this,  the 
French  want  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  I  told 
M.  Clemenceau  that  I  could  not  consent  to  such  a  so¬ 
lution  of  the  problem.  He  became  very  much  excited 
and  then  demanded  ownership  of  the  Saar  Basin.  I  told 
him  I  could  not  agree  to  that  either  because  it  would 
mean  giving  300,000  Germans  to  France.  I  do  not 
know  whether  I  shall  see  M.  Clemenceau  again.  I  do  not 
know  whether  he  will  return  to  the  meeting  this  after¬ 
noon.  In  fact,  I  do  not  know  whether  the  Peace  Con¬ 
ference  will  continue.  M.  Clemenceau  called  me  a  pro- 
German  and  abruptly  left  the  room.”1 

So  insistent  were  the  French  leaders  in  their  extreme 
demands  that  President  Wilson  threatened  to  withdraw 
from  the  Peace  Conference — he  went  so  far  as  to  cable 
for  the  George  Washington.  This  action  caused  them 
to  abandon  their  demands  at  least  temporarily.  There 
were  probably  three  main  reasons  why  they  did  this. 

1  “What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,”  edited  by  E.  M.  House,  pp. 
464,  465. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  19 

First,  they  desired  to  preserve  the  Entente  at  any  cost, 
not  daring  to  act  alone  at  that  time.  Second,  they  had 
already  secured  provisions  which  placed  Germany  abso¬ 
lutely  at  their  mercy  for  fifteen  years,  and  probably  for 
thirty  years.  Third,  they  believed  that  their  extreme 
demands  could  be  gained  by  waiting. 

On  this  latter  point  M.  Tardieu  and  M.  Clemenceau 
have  made  significant  admissions.  In  his  book,  “The 
Truth  About  the  Treaty,”  M.  Tardieu  has  written: 
“Evacuation  is  to  be  by  zones,  every  five  years,  but  only 
on  condition  that  Germany  faithfully  complies  with  the 
Peace  Treaty.  ...  We  modified  them  (our  terms)  on 
certain  points.  .  .  .  But  we  did  not  consent  to  give  up 
occupation  any  more  than  the  right  to  prolong  it.  In 
his  Introduction  to  M.  Tardieu’s  book,  M.  Clemenceau 
has  written:  “This  Treaty,  like  all  treaties,  is  and  can 
only  be  a  prolongation  of  war  activities  until  complete 

fulfillment.” 

Mr.  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  a  distinguished  English 
writer,  has  called  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  during 
the  crisis  of  the  Peace  Conference,  M.  Clemenceau,  one 
day  while  under  fire  from  General  Foch  and  M.  Jules 
Cambon  for  yielding  to  President  Wilson,  turned  to  Pres¬ 
ident  Poincare,  with  these  highly  significant  words: 
“Mr.  President,  you  are  much  younger  than  I.  In  fifteen 
years  the  Germans  will  not  have  executed  all  the 
clauses  of  the  treaty,  and  in  fifteen  years,  if  you  do  me 
the  honour  to  come  to  my  tomb,  you  will  be  able  to  say 
to  me,  I  am  convinced  of  it,  ‘We  are  on  the  Rhine  and 

we  shall  stay  there /  ”1 2  . 

In  the  light  of  these  words  and  m  view  of  the  con¬ 
sistency  with  which  the  French  leaders  have  followed 
their  policy  of  crushing  Germany’s  economic  power,  the 
invasion  of  the  Ruhr  by  French  and  Belgian  troops  in 
January,  1923,  assumes  new  significance.  It  will  be  re¬ 
called  that  even  during  the  Peace  Conference  the  French 
leaders  suggested  the  military  occupation  of  Essen,  the 
most  important  city  of  the  Ruhr.  Four  years  later, 


1  p  201  , 

2  Quoted  by  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  “War:  Its  Nature,  Cause  and  Cure, 

p.  94. 


20  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

America  having  withdrawn  and  Great  Britain  being 
powerless  to  prevent  it,  France  seized  the  Ruhr. 

In  Europe,  outside  of  France,  and  in  certain  circles 
within  France,  it  is  almost  universally  believed  that  the 
French  are  not  in  the  Ruhr  primarily  for  reparations. 
The  fact  is  unmistakable  that  they  have  received  far  less 
reparations  since  the  Ruhr  invasion  than  before.  Every 
week  France  stays  in  the  Ruhr  weakens  Germany’s  eco¬ 
nomic  power  and  reduces  her  capacity  to  pay  reparations. 
The  French  leaders  know  this  and  privately  admit  that 
the  invasion  of  the  Ruhr  is  not  a  paying  proposition 
financially.  In  spite  of  this  they  continue  to  occupy 
the  Ruhr  and  all  evidence  supports  the  contention  that 
they  are  there  to  stay.  Why?  Because  they  have  al¬ 
ways  maintained  that  security  is  jar  more  important 
than  reparations.  French  leaders  still  assert  that  the 
security  of  France  demands  the  crushing  of  Germany’s 
economic  power.  The  Ruhr  is  the  very  economic  heart 
of  Germany.  In  it  are  concentrated  the  great  basic 
industries  of  Europe.  Without  the  Ruhr,  Germany 
simply  cannot  exist  as  a  great  industrial  nation.  And 
so  the  French  have  sought  for  four  years  to  occupy  that 
strategic  center.  And  now  they  are  there.  In  an  address 
on  September  16,  1923,  President  Poincare  spoke  very 
plainly:  “We  hold  pledges  and  we  shall  keep  them  until 
we  have  received  satisfaction.  ...  We  know  well  that 
Germany,  not  having  executed  any  one  of  the  clauses  of 
the  Treaty,  successive  Governments  in  France  since  1919 
have  declared  that  the  periods  of  occupation  of  the  left 
bank  have  not  yet  commenced  to  run” 

An  abundance  of  evidence  as  to  France’s  intentions  in 
the  Ruhr  is  contained  in  a  secret  report  to  the  French 
Government  by  M.  Dariac,  President  of  the  Finance 
Commission  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  was  later 
published  by  the  Manchester  Guardian  under  the  title 
“The  Dariac  Report.”  The  following  significant  sentences 
are  taken  from  this  report:  “The  whole  of  French  policy 
in  the  Rhineland  is  at  all  times  subordinate  to  one 
primary  condition,  the  prolonged  maintenance  of  our 
army  of  the  Rhine  in  the  occupied  territories.  ...  A 
well-considered  diplomacy  must  apply  one  after  another 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  21 

the  successive  links  of  a  well-thought-out  course  of  action 
which,  little  by  little,  will  detach  from  Germany  a  free 
Rhineland  under  the  military  guard  of  France  and  Bel¬ 
gium”  The  Manchester  Guardian  says  in  this  connec¬ 
tion:  “As  regards  the  Saar  no  less  than  as  regards  the 
Rhineland  and  the  Ruhr,  everything  in  this  report  points 
to  an  indefinite  and  virtually  permanent  occupation  ot 
both  districts.” 

It  would  be  untrue,  of  course,  to  say  that  France  alone 
has  sought  to  crush  Germany.  At  some  points  the 
British  program  was  even  more  severe  than  that  of 
France.  While  on  some  points  the  Italian  and  Amen 
can  delegates  opposed  the  French  policy,  on  many  others 
they  gave  enthusiastic  support.  It  is.  obvious  that  so 
many  of  the  French  demands  would  never  have  been  in 
corporated  into  the  Treaty  without  the  suppoit  of  her 
allies.  Because  her  danger  was  greater  and  her  fear 
more  intense,  France  has  been  more  vigorous  and  untir¬ 
ing  in  her  efforts  to  crush  Germany.  With  the  passionate 
desire  of  France  for  security,  all  of  us  deeply  sympathize. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  however,  that  desire  for 
security  has  not  been  the  only  motive  behind  French 
policy.  No  individual  is  motivated  by  a  single  desire. 
Much  more  is  this  true  of  nations.  There  has  been  an 
element  of  greed  in  French  policy,  as  in  that  of  every 
other  nation.  Nationalism  and  imperialism  have  not 
been  absent.  French  fear  has  given  the  forces  of  greed 
and  imperialism  a  chance  which  they  have  not  been  slow 
to  accept.  The  writer  is  convinced,  however,  that  fear 
has  been  and  is  today  the  corner-stone  of  French  policy. 
He  has  no  desire  to  bring  an  indictment  against  France. 
His  only  concern  is  to  get  at  the  facts  as  to  how  the 
French  leaders  are  actually  seeking  permanent  security, 
and  to  inquire  as  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  measures 
which  they  have  adopted.  Our  next  step,  therefore,  is 
to  discover  the  actual  results  achieved  by  the  French 

policy. 


Ill:  CONSEQUENCES  OF  FRENCH 

FEAR 

(1 )  Effects  Upon  Militarism 

For  many  decades  prior  to  the  World  War,  militarism 
was  the  supreme  menace  to  the  peoples  of  Europe.  One 
of  the  great  objectives  of  the  war  was  to  destroy  mili¬ 
tarism  and  end  war  forever.  What  has  been  the  effect 
of  French  fear  upon  militarism?  The  answer  is  found 
in  the  present  state  of  affairs  in  Europe.  So  great  has 
been  the  fear  of  France  that  she  has  lost  all  confidence 
in  other  means  of  protection  than  military  force.  Be¬ 
cause  of  this  she  has  maintained  a  larger  army  since  the 
war  than  Germany  had  before  the  war. 

Moreover,  she  has  encouraged  her  smaller  allies  to 
support  large  armies.  Of  even  greater  consequence,  her 
policy  is  causing  deep  concern  in  Great  Britain,  and  we 
seem  to  be  witnessing  the  beginning  of  a  new  race  of 
armaments,  especially  in  aeroplanes.  The  fear  of  France 
has  prevented  serious  discussion  of  a  general  reduction 
of  armaments.  Her  policy  of  depending  upon  military 
force  has  been  adopted  by  Mussolini.  Just  who  will  be 
next  in  imitation  of  France  cannot  be  predicted.  The 
evidence  is  complete  that  the  fear  of  France  is  by  far 
the  greatest  of  all  current  obstacles  to  an  adequate  re¬ 
duction  in  armaments,  and  is  also  the  most  powerful 
support  of  the  philosophy  of  military  force  in  the  world 
today. 

(2)  Effects  Upon  the  League  of  Nations 

From  the  standpoint  of  ultimates,  the  League  of  Na¬ 
tions  was  probably  the  greatest  gain  of  the  war.  There 
is  no  hope  of  permanent  peace  unless  the  sphere  of  law 
and  orderly  government  is  extended  to  include  interna- 

22 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  23 

tional  relations.  Just  as  the  Greek  cities  could  not 
endure  permanently  as  sovereign  units;  just  as  the  thir¬ 
teen  free  and  independent  States  in  America  could  not 
have  retained  all  their  sovereign  rights  and  refused  to 
form  an  effective  Federal  Union  without  disastrous  con¬ 
sequences;  so  the  nations  of  the  earth  in  this  generation 
cannot  escape  further  wars  unless  they  speedily  erect 
effective  international  processes  of  justice — legislative, 
adjudicatory  and  administrative.  There  is  simply* no 
other  alternative.  The  League  is  a  step  in  the  right  di¬ 
rection.  It  has  many  weaknesses  and  severe  limitations, 
but  it  is  an  advance  over  any  previous  effort  to  construct 
effective  international  processes  of  justice. 

The  fear  of  France  and  her  dependence  upon  military 
force  have  been  the  chief  barriers  to  the  League’s  suc¬ 
cessful  operation.  She  has  consistently  refused  to  grant 
adequate  power  to  the  League,  and  has  repeatedly  re¬ 
fused  to  allow  the  major  problems  of  Europe  to  come 
before  it  for  settlement.  She  has  done  much  more  to 
support  the  old  balance  of  power  idea  than  to  encourage 
the  development  of  a  real  League.  Indeed,  the  French 
conception  of  a  League  advanced  at  the  Peace  Conference 
was  one  based  upon  military  force,  with  an  international 
army,  a  sort  of  glorified  Supreme  War  Council. 

The  example  of  France  in  refusing  to  acknowledge  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  League  was  recently  followed  by  Mus¬ 
solini,  who  told  the  League  in  plain  words  to  keep  its 
hands  off,  that  what  he  was  doing  in  Corfu  was  none 
of  its  business.  France  is  in  the  strategic  position  of 
being  able  to  make  or  break  the  League.  Thus  far  her 
fear  has  caused  it  grave  injury. 

(3)  Effects  Upon  the  German  People 

French  fear  and  French  dependence  upon  military 
force  have  had  profound  effects  upon  the  German  people. 
To  understand  how  the  Germans  view  the  actions  of 
France,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  they  too  endured 
untold  agonies  throughout  the  war.  The  number  of  Ger¬ 
mans  killed  in  the  war  was  far  greater  than  the  number 
of  French  dead.  While  Germany  had  only  a  small  dev¬ 
astated  area  in  East  Prussia,  the  total  volume  of  suf- 


24  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

fering  in  Germany  was  almost  certainly  in  excess  of  that 
in  France,  due  to  the  fact  that  Germany  was  blockaded 
throughout  the  war  and  for  six  months  after  the  Arm¬ 
istice.  There  was  relatively  little  shortage  of  food  in 
France  during  the  war,  while  in  Germany  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men,  women  and  children  died  of  actual 
starvation  or  malnutrition  due  to  lack  of  proper  food. 

Moreover,  the  German  people,  like  the  people  in  all 
belligerent  countries,  were  victims  of  fear  and  war-prop¬ 
aganda.  The  vast  majority  of  German  people  thought 
they  were  fighting  in  self-defence.  Two  visits  to  Ger¬ 
many  since  the  war  have  convinced  the  writer  that  the 
truth  of  this  statement  is  beyond  question. 

The  series  of  secret  treaties  entered  into  by  the  Allied 
Governments  during  the  early  days  of  the  war,  in  which 
provisions  were  made  for  dividing  up  important  sections 
of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  among  themselves — 
and  there  is  absolutely  no  doubt  as  to  the  authenticity 
of  these  treaties,  which  later  were  published — were 
seized  upon  by  the  Germans  as  proof  of  the  aggressive¬ 
ness  of  the  Allies,  and  served  to  strengthen  their  con¬ 
victions  that  they  were  fighting  in  self-defence. 

The  Germans  finally  surrendered  on  a  basis  of  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  subsequent  addresses  of  President 
Wilson.  The  Allied  Governments  solemnly  agreed  to 
make  peace  on  this  basis,  with  two  reservations.  The 
German  people  are  convinced  beyond  the  shadow  of  a 
doubt  that  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  a  fundamental 
and  wholesale  violation  of  this  promise.  They  believe 
that  the  Allies  regarded  the  Armistice  terms  as  mere 
scraps  of  paper. 

They  point  to  such  provisions  in  the  Fourteen  Points 
and  subsequent  addresses  of  President  Wilson  as:  “the 
removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers  and 
the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions 
among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  ...  a 
free  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment 
of  all  colonial  claims  ...  we  do  not  wish  to  fight  her 
(Germany)  either  with  arms  or  with  hostile  arrange¬ 
ments  of  trade  .  .  .  there  shall  be  no  annexations ,  no 
contributions,  no  punitive  damages  .  .  .  peoples  and 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


25 


provinces  are  not  to  be  bartered  about  from  sovereignty 
to  sovereignty  as  if  they  were  chattels  and  pawns  in  a 
game  .  .  .  we  are  ready  to  deal  fairly  with  the  German 
Power  .  .  .  evenhanded  and  dispassionate  justice  to 
Germany  .  .  .  the  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power 
anywhere  ...  to  the  end  that  convenants  may  be  sa¬ 
credly  observed,  no  private  plots  or  conspiracies  hatched, 
no  selfish  injuries  wrought  with  impunity  .  .  .  the  final 
triumph  of  justice  and  fair  dealing” — they  point  to  these 
statements  which  were  accepted  by  the  Allies  as  the  basis 
of  peace,  and  then  point  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

The  German  people  are  wholly  convinced  that  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  are  absolutely  incapable  of  fulfill¬ 
ment.  They  recognize  the  justice  of  the  claim  that  the 
French  and  Belgian  devastated  areas  should  be  restored, 
and  point  out  that  while  Rathenau  and  other  German 
leaders  have  repeatedly  offered  to  restore  these  areas,1 
the  French  leaders  have  always  refused  to  accept  their 
offers,  and  have  insisted  upon  a  huge  indemnity,  only 
one-third  of  which  is  for  the  restoration  of  the  devastated 
areas.  They  believe  that  the  French  leaders  recognize 
the  impossibility  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  being  car¬ 
ried  out.  To  the  Germans  the  Treaty  means  the  deter¬ 
mination  of  France  to  crush  them  completely. 

As  evidence  of  this,  they  point  to  the  words  of  M. 
Clemenceau,  spoken  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  : 

1  “German  efforts  to  reconstruct  the  devastated  districts  of  France 
were  first  expressed  officially  at  Versailles  in  May,  1919,  and  were  wel¬ 
comed  by  the  Allies.  In  the  following  July  negotiations  were  opened 
between  the  French  and  German  Governments  for  reafforestation  and 
reorganisation  of  coal  mines:  .  .  .  Further  suggestions  made  in  Novem¬ 
ber  by  Dr.  Gessler,  Minister  of  Reconstruction,  were  rejected.  In  July, 
1920,  at  the  Spa  Conference  a  scheme  for  a  great  co-operative  effort  in 
French  reconstruction  was  introduced,  but  gained  little  attention.  At 
the  Brussels  Conference  of  experts  in  December,  1920,  Dr.  Bergmann, 
German  Secretary  of  State,  again  expressed  Germany’s  desire  to  co¬ 
operate  in  restoring  the  ruined  districts,  but  again  nothing  resulted. 
Once  more,  at  the  London  Conference  in  March,  1921,  Dr.  Simons 
reiterated  this  desire,  but  still  there  was  no  response.  In  April,  1921, 
a  very  great  effort  was  made  to  participate  in  restoration  work.  The 
German  Trade  Unions  wished  to  co-operate  in  'erecting  brick  and  tile 
plants,  lime  kilns  and  cement  works,  and  to  deliver  and  put  together 
at  least  25,000  wooden  houses.  This  great  plan  practically  came  to 
nothing,  all  that  resulted  being  the  delivery  of  101  specimen  houses.” — 
British  Bureau  of  Ruhr  Information,  Bulletin  No.  6,  October  9,  1923. 


26  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

“I  conceive  of  life  after  the  war  as  a  continual  conflict, 
whether  there  be  war  or  peace.  I  believe  it  was  Bern- 
hardi  who  said  that  politics  are  war  conducted  with  other 
weapons.  We  can  invert  this  aphorism,  and  say  that 
peace  is  war  conducted  with  other  weapons.” 

They  believe  that  the  French  leaders  have  never 
abandoned  their  extreme  demands,  and  point  to  subse¬ 
quent  occupations  of  Dusseldorf  and  Duisburg  in  1921, 
and  the  Ruhr  in  1923,  as  proof.  They  say  that  if  the  oc¬ 
cupation  of  the  Ruhr  is  legal,  the  same  line  of  reasoning 
will  also  justify  the  occupation  of  Berlin  at  the  discretion 
of  France.  They  feel  sure  that  they  have  not  yet  seen 
the  limits  of  French  occupation  of  their  territory.  They 
do  not  believe  that  the  French  leaders  will  be  satisfied 
until  Germany  is  completely  crushed  and  dismembered. 

French  fear  and  French  determination  to  destroy  Ger¬ 
many’s  power  to  menace  Europe,  have  had  fatal  effects 
upon  the  German  people.  It  has  wholly  convinced  them 
that  they  were  fighting  in  self-defence,  and  has  caused 
them  to  regard  themselves  as  martyrs  to  the  vindictive¬ 
ness  of  France.  This  may  seem  preposterous  to  others, 
but  the  evidence  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  that  this  is  the 
way  vast  multitudes  of  German  people  actually  feel. 

When  people  regard  themselves  as  martyrs,  there  is 
little  likelihood  that  at  the  same  time  they  will  have  a 
sense  of  genuine  penitence.  The  hope  of  the  world  at 
the  end  of  the  war  rested  in  the  creation  of  a  sense  of 
penitence  on  the  part  of  the  German  people.  French 
fear  has  almost  completely  destroyed  this  hope. 

(Jf.)  Economic  Effects  Upon  Europe 

We  have  already  summarized  the  economic  effects  of 
the  Treaty  upon  Germany.  It  should  be  remembered, 
moreover,  that  the  German  people  have  already  paid  in 
full  for  German  war  expenses.  The  net  cost  of  the  war 
to  Germany,  according  to  Professor  Bogart’s  estimate, 
was  37  billion  dollars,  as  compared  with  a  total  of  35 
billions  for  Great  Britain  and  24  billions  for  France. 
This  huge  sum  came  out  of  the  pockets  of  the  German 
people  in  taxation  and  the  purchase  of  bonds.  The  col¬ 
lapse  of  the  mark  has  made  these  bonds  worthless. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  27 

Therefore,  the  debt  of  the  German  Government  has  been 
wiped  out.  But  at  what  a  cost !  While  England  is  groan¬ 
ing  under  the  prospect  of  having  to  pay  the  United 
States  five  billions  in  sixty  years,  and  France  states  that 
she  is  unable  even  to  consider  paying  interest  on  her 
loan  of  four  billions  from  the  United  States,  the  German 
people  have  paid  37  billion  dollars  for  war  costs  and  have 
absolutely  nothing  to  show  for  it.  So  far  as  they  are  con¬ 
cerned  it  is  gone  forever.  The  present  generation  has 
already  paid  in  full  the  total  cost  of  the  war  to  Germany. 

Yet  she  is  expected  to  pay  a  huge  indemnity.  The 
result  has  been  that  German  finance  and  industry  have 
steadily  declined.  The  French  occupation  of  the  Ruhr, 
with  the  consequent  dislocation  of  industry  in  this  most 
important  center  of  Germany,  precipitated  the  collapse 
of  the  mark.  When  the  French  entered  Essen  on  Jan¬ 
uary  11,  1923,  the  mark  was  quoted  at  10,000  for  a  dollar. 
Now  it  has  dropped  to  420  billions  for  a  dollar,  that  is  to 
say,  it  is  now  practically  worthless.  This  has  resulted 
in  indescribable  suffering  and  misery  for  millions  of  Ger¬ 
mans,  and  is  rapidly  bringing  German  industry  to  a 
standstill.  Everybody  with  whom  we  talked  during  a 
recent  visit  agreed  that  there  is  certain  to  be  violence, 
revolution,  and  chaos  in  Germany  before  the  winter  is 
over. 

The  collapse  of  German  industry  is  having  a  terrific 
effect  throughout  the  whole  continent.  Mr.  Herbert 
Hoover  has  pointed  out  that  there  are  100  million  more 
people  in  Europe  than  can  be  supported  except  by  a 
highly  efficient  industrial  organization.  Europe  is  now 
an  economic  unit.  Before  the  war  Germany  was  the 
most  important  cog  in  this  industrial  machine.  Upon 
the  prosperity  of  Germany  depended  the  prosperity  of 
vast  multitudes  in  other  countries.  This  is  still  true. 
There  is  no  possibility  whatever  of  Europe’s  economic 
recovery  so  long  as  German  finance  and  industry  are  in 
a  state  of  chaos .  French  fear  is,  therefore,  having 
disastrous  effects  upon  the  economic  life  of  Europe,  in¬ 
deed  upon  the  economic  life  of  America  and  the  whole 
world. 

Concerning  the  economic  consequences  of  the  Treaty, 


28  FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 

Mr.  Frank  Vanderlip,  a  well-known  American  banker, 
says:  “The  Treaties  were  dictated  in  a  spirit  of  reprisal, 
revenge  and  selfishness,  and  in  economic  blindness.  The 
evils  that  flow  from  those  unhappy  facts  are  injuring 
Europe  more  seriously  than  did  the  war  itself.” 

(5)  Effects  Upon  French  Security 

In  many  ways  the  most  tragic  of  all  the  consequences 
of  French  fear  is  found  at  this  point.  French  fear  has 
destroyed  the  foundations  of  French  security.  It  has 
resulted  in  a  blind  trust  in  military  power  and  has 
destroyed  confidence  in  other  means  of  protection.  It 
has,  therefore,  perpetuated  militarism  and  hindered  all 
efforts  to  establish  effective  international  processes  of 
justice.  It  has  enormously  intensified  the  bitterness  and 
hatred  on  the  part  of  millions  of  Germans,  and  has  there¬ 
by  increased  the  possibilities  of  a  war  of  revenge  in  an¬ 
other  generation. 

The  following  words  spoken  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  dur¬ 
ing  the  Peace  Conference  contain  sound  advice  to  France : 
“Tou  may  strip  Germany  of  her  colonies,  reduce  her 
armaments  to  a  mere  police  force  and  her  navy  to  that 
of  a  fifth-rate  power;  all  the  same  in  the  end  if  she  feels 
that  she  has  been  unjustly  treated  in  the  Peace  of  1919 
she  will  find  means  of  exacting  retribution  from  her 
conquerors.” 

Judged  by  temporary  visible  results,  the  well-rounded 
policy  of  France  seems  to  be  succeeding.  Germany  i^ 
completely  at  her  mercy.  No  nation  since  the  days  of 
Napoleon  has  been  so  dominant  on  the  continent  of 
Europe.  Moreover,  she  is  now  in  a  more  prosperous 
condition  than  almost  any  other  nation  of  Europe.  All 
seems  to  be  going  well  with  France.  And  so  it  seemed 
to  Emperor  Napoleon  and  to  Kaiser  William. 

Sooner  or  later  French  military  domination  of  Europe 
is  sure  to  be  challenged  by  a  combination  of  other  powers. 
The  lesson  of  history  at  this  point  is  clear  and  unmistak¬ 
able.  There  is  no  security  in  military  power.  It  always 
brings  its  own  nemesis.  Again  and  again  single  nations 
have  dominated  continents  for  a  time — but  only  for  a 
time.  France  thinks  she  is  achieving  security.  But 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE  29 

France  is  blind.  Security  cannot  be  achieved  by  con¬ 
verting  Europe  into  a  perpetual  barracks.  Permanent 
security  can  only  rest  upon  law  and  international  proc¬ 
esses  of  justice. 

The  more  France  depends  upon  military  power  and 
the  more  vigorously  she  seeks  to  crush  her  enemies,  the 
more  unstable  becomes  her  own  security,  and  the  more 
certain  becomes  her  ultimate  downfall.  There  is  pro¬ 
found  truth  in  the  words  of  the  Great  Teacher:  “They 
that  take  the  sword  shall  perish  by  the  sword/’ 


i 


IV:  WHAT  CAN  THE  UNITED 
STATES  DO  ABOUT  IT? 


(1)  We  can  help  France  to  achieve  permanent  security 
by  aiding  in  the  creation  of  effective  international  proc¬ 
esses  of  justice.  There  is  no  permanent  safety  in  huge 
armies  and  navies  nor  in  military  alliances  with  other 
nations.  We  do  not  need  any  further  proof  of  the  futility 
of  national  armaments  and  the  balance  of  power  system 
to  maintain  peace.  We  now  know  that  individuals  and 
groups  can  gain  justice  and  safety  only  by  substituting 
law  and  orderly  government  for  violence.  It  is  high 
time  that  we  should  also  recognize  that  this  is  equally 
true  of  nations.  International  law  and  international 
processes  of  justice  are  absolutely  essential  if  nations  are 
to  achieve  justice  and  security.  Long  experience  has 
demonstrated  that  three  phases  of  orderly  government 
are  essential:  legislation,  adjudication  and  administra¬ 
tion.  If  France  and  the  other  nations  of  Europe  are 
to  be  made  secure  there  must  be  a  codification  of  existing 
international  law,  the  enactment  of  new  laws,  the  crea¬ 
tion  of  effective  international  courts,  and  the  setting  in 
motion  of  adequate  processes  of  administration  of  in¬ 
ternational  understandings  and  agreements,  and  the 
willingness  to  abide  by  the  common  decisions  of  the 
nations. 

As  the  richest,  most  powerful  and  most  secure  of  all 
the  nations,  very  heavy  responsibility  rests  upon  the 
United  States  to  support  every  effort  to  substitute 
orderly  government  between  nations  for  the  present 
international  anarchy  and  chaos. 

(2)  We  can  aid  France  and  the  rest  of  Europe  by 
taking  the  lead  in  calling  a  world  conference  on  economic 
problems.  At  the  time  of  writing,  M.  Poincare  is  insist¬ 
ing  upon  restrictions  that  would  prevent  effective  action 

30 


FRANCE  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  EUROPE 


31 


by  an  international  economic  conference.  If  the  United 
States  should  take  a  positive  and  vigorous  stand  on  this 
question,  we  probably  could  gain  sufficient  support  from 
other  nations  to  make  it  unlikely  that  France  would  be 
willing  to  play  a  lone  hand.  It  should  be  fully  recog¬ 
nized,  however,  that  there  is  no  permanent  solution  of 
the  reparation  question  apart  from  a  scaling  down  or 
wiping  out  of  inter-allied  debts.  There  is  no  escape  from 
further  economic  chaos  except  by  mutual  forbearance 
between  the  nations.  Of  all  the  great  powers  the  United 
States  is  best  able  to  lead  the  way. 

(3)  We  can  aid  France  by  taking  the  lead  in  the  move¬ 
ment  for  a  drastic  reduction  in  national  armaments.  The 
precedent  of  the  Washington  Conference,  together  with 
our  unsurpassed  geographic  location,  set  us  apart  as  the 
logical  nation  to  take  the  initiative  in  this  regard.  Our 
superior  economic  position  is  also  a  factor  of  great  im¬ 
portance.  Public  opinion  should  insist  that  our  govern¬ 
ment  take  prompt  and  vigorous  action  in  cooperating 
with  other  nations  in  calling  a  halt  to  the  mad  race  of 
armaments  and  in  the  movement  for  the  outlawry  of 
war. 

The  evidence  seems  to  indicate  clearly  that  France 
cannot  gain  security  by  the  means  which  she  has  adopted 
and  in  which  her  faith  now  rests.  On  the  contrary,  she 
is  undermining  her  own  safety  by  perpetuating  mili¬ 
tarism  and  the  vicious  balance  of  power  system.  The 
United  States  is  the  only  nation  sufficiently  disinterested 
and  powerful  to  help  France  abandon  the  fatal  policy 
which  she  is  now  following.  The  peace  of  Europe  is 
now  in  the  hands  of  France.  Her  own  security  and  that 
of  the  rest  of  Europe  depends  upon  the  creating  and 
strengthening  of  international  processes  of  justice.  The 
support  of  the  United  States  is  absolutely  essential  if 
orderly  government  between  nations  is  to  be  established 
in  time  to  prevent  the  further  decay  of  western  civiliza¬ 
tion.  In  the  face  of  such  a  responsibility  and  confronted 
with  such  a  challenge,  can  there  be  any  doubt  as  to 
what  course  the  United  States  should  follow? 


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